Tajiks

By Eden Naby

Tadjiks, Tadzhiks.

Tajiks are a Central Asian people who live in Afghanistan, in republics of the former Soviet Union, and in China. The Republic of Tajikistan, emerging after the breakup of the Soviet Union, contains most of the world Tajik population. Tojikistoni shuravi (Soviet Tadzhikistan), a sovereign republic, was formed in 1929 out of a portion of the former csarist Russian empire in Central Asia.

The distinguishing features of Tajiks are their language, sedentary life-style, and Islamic-Iranian culture. The widespread use of "Tajik" as an ethnopolitical term emerged with Soviet usage; prior to that, regional rather than linguistic affiliation held the key to self-identity. In Soviet usage, the term "Tajik" also includes speakers of non-Persian Iranian languages who inhabit mountain valleys in the Pamir mountain area such as Sarikolis, Wakhis, and Shugnis.

Tajik-inhabited areas fall roughly between 65° and 75° W and 35° to 42° N. Tajikistan is the southeast-ernmost of the republics of the former Soviet Union and is bordered by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to the west and north, the Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China to the east, and Afghanistan to the south. The total area of Tajikistan is 143,100 square kilometers. The entire Tajik-inhabited region is very mountainous with narrow valleys; agriculture is nourished by mineral silt and irrigation waters from fast-flowing rivers fed by melting snows. The rivers form tributaries of the Panj, which flows into the Amu Darya (Oxus River). Northern Tajikistan includes parts of the Ferghana Valley, where the waters eventually meet to flow into the Syr Darya (Jaxartes River).

Geographically, the Tajik Republic is trifurcated by mountains that are impassable by road in winter. The northern portion is dominated by the town of Khojent, formerly Leninabad; the capital, Dushanbe, known from 1930 to 1931 as Stalinabad, is in the south. To the east, but still part of the Tajik Republic, is the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, a sparsely populated area inhabited mainly by small, valley ethnic groups including Kyrgyz. The major urban center of this area has become Khorog.

The climate falls within the temporal continental high-altitude range with about 320 days of sunlight. Precipitation occurs as rain and snow, mainly between November and April. Summers are hot and dry with mean daytime temperature in July ranging from 23 to 30° C.

The world Tajik population is more difficult to analyze than that within the republics of the former Soviet Union, although this too has been subject to manipulation, especially outside Tajikstan. The 1989 census placed the number of Tajiks within the Soviet Union at 4,217,000, 3,168,000 of these residing within their own republic and 932,000 in Uzbekistan; in other words, about 99 percent of the Tajiks reside in these two republics. Together with the estimated 4 million Dari speakers in Afghanistan, who may also be identified broadly as Tajik, and smaller numbers in the People's Republic of China, the world Tajik population may be estimated at about 9 million. Since the 1959 Soviet census, Tajiks have increased in number by 201.9 percent, making them the fastest-growing major ethnic group of the former Soviet Union. They constitute 62.25 percent of the population of Tajikistan and 4.7 percent of that of Uzbekistan (Uzbeks constitute 23.52 percent of that of Tajikistan). The number of Russians in Tajikistan is declining (7 percent in 1989) and down to about 4 percent at the end of the 20th century. By 2000 the population of Tajikistan stood at 6,440,732 showing a growth rate of 2.12%. Of the total population, 42% was under 14 years of age. Tajiks who fled to Afghanistan during the civil war and were aided by the UNHCR, have largely returned to their homes or they have emigrated outside.

The standard Tajik dialect is mutually intelligible with the Persian of Iran and the Dari of Afghanistan and is increasingly being called either Farsi-Tojiki or Farsi (Persian), all of which form the major living branch of the Iranian Language Family, in turn a branch of the large Indo-European group of languages. In addition to standard Tajik, nineteen dialects exist, which differ from each other morphologically and phonetically. Rural mountain valley people cannot be readily understood by urban Tajiks, who generally use the standard dialect. Tajik intellectuals are monolingual (Russian), bilingual (Tajik and Russian), or trilingual (Tajik, Russian, and Uzbek). The Tajiks, on the whole, are one of the least Russified Muslim communities of the former Soviet Union; in 1979, only 22,666 claimed Russian as their "first native language."

Tajik historical development is intertwined with that of the other sedentary people of Central Asia, especially the Uzbeks. Before the coming of the Turks to the area and their eventual sedentarization, Iranian groups dominated the urban oases. Islam eventually became universally accepted and Turkic conquerors adjusted their religious and literary culture to that of the local inhabitants whom they ruled. Local (Tajik) administrators continued to dominate in public life under Turkic tribally affiliated rulers. This hybrid Turko-Iranian culture dominated the important oases towns, especially Bukhara and Samarkand. Bilingualism--Tajik and (Turkic) Chagatay or Uzbek-- was widespread both on the literate and nonliterate level through the early twentieth century. Most Tajik areas fell under the Bukharan and Khokand khanates until the latter was destroyed by czarist forces in 1876 and incorporated into the Turkestan governor-generalship. Resistance to czarist, then Bolshevik rule gained strength in Tajik areas where Basmachi bands of Uzbeks and Tajiks were finally stamped out only in 1932. With the division of Soviet Central Asia along ethnolinguistic lines in 1924, a Tajik Autonomous SSR was set aside within the Uzbek SSR and this, by 1929, became a full-fledged Tajik SSR. Most of the educated and elite Tajiks lived in Bukhara and Samarkand and made the transition to Dushanbe and other Tajik territory with reluctance. Both the status and the size of the Tajik population in these two cities are sources of conflict; many Tajiks feel that these cities, together with Khiva, as traditional Tajik centers of culture, should be part of Tajikistan.

Disentangling a distinct Tajik culture from the Uzbek culture around it--and from non-Soviet Persian culture--became the focus of cultural activity during the Stalinist period. Separate Tajik institutions, organized on the All-Union model, labored to use valley dialects, history, and especially archaeology to create a Tajik history delinked from Islam and distinct from other Central Asian culture. Thawing of Soviet-Iranian relations led to ever-closer Iranian-Tajik cultural relations; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) saw increasing Tajik tutelage of Afghans in Kabul as well as in Dushanbe. Important in this international cultural linking have been Russians and Russianized Tajiks. The Uzbek-Tajik bilingual pattern has been replaced by a Tajik-Russian one. Tension is growing today between the Tajiks and Uzbeks, owing in part to attempts by the latter to increase their power in Tajikistan.

On the eve of the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tajikistan became independent but still under the control of the functionaries from the Soviet period. By late 1992 democratic opposition had forced the displacement of leading old communists, but the challenge to stability came with the rise of regionally based Islamic parties. Into this mix entered Iran and Russia with the former expressing a wish to aid a fellow Persianate entity and the latter worried about vulnerability to Islamic extremist creepand concern in the region that Tajikistan would become another area of conflict like neighboring Afghanistan. As the poorest country of the former Soviet Union, the Tajik economy fell victim to lack of energy resources and an inability to export and import due to the war in Afghanistan and fear by its neighbors that the emerging civil war would spread into other parts of Central Asia. At the end of the civil war (1992-1997) reconstruction efforts spearheaded by the UN, the International Monetary Fund and through bilateral arrangements with other countries have encouraged the creation of a flexible infrastructure for economic development. Despite the introduction of a Tajik currency the Osomoni, reliance on foreign currency is widespread.

As pressure on Tajiks in Afghanistan began to mount, beginning in 1994, to give way before Pushtun forces of the Taliban, Afghanistan's Tajiks sought shelter in the relatively less violent areas of Tajikistan. Ostensible consultation trips by President Burhannudin Rabbani to Dushanbe extended over months, especially when the Taliban drove the Tajik and allied ethnic forces out of Kabul in 1996. The close working relationship developed by the Northern Alliance to include the former communist Uzbek leader of Afghanistan, who in turn was supported by Tashkent, brought about a confluence of interests among leaders in Tashkent, Moscow, Dushanbe and even Iran. It remains to be seen whether with the removal of the Taliban from Kabul, this working relationship will continue.

Most of Tajikistan is rural; 85 percent of the population lives in valleys and mountain areas up to 1,600 meters in elevation. Most of these settlements are organized in the kolkhoz/sovkhoz pattern superimposed on former villages ( deh kishlaq, which are sometimes equivalent to loosely extended families practicing endogamy). There are pockets of industrialization in rural areas where non-Tajiks as well as Tajiks work. In the north and south population density runs from 50 to 150 per square kilometer, whereas in the mountains it is as low as 5 to 10. New urban settlements have expanded from former villages. Urban administrative centers, especially Dushanbe, have grown along Western patterns, with roads for motorized vehicles, apartment blocks, parks, and industries. Old villages retain extended family homes, often placed within orchards and vineyards. Walled compounds ensure household privacy.

Under the Soviet system, Tajikistan became organized along Soviet Marxist economic lines. Cotton, a commercial product developed during the czarist period, has dominated Tajik agriculture--Tajikistan ranks second among former republics of the Soviet Union in cotton production. Other agricultural products, geared to the western, urban Soviet centers, include grapes and orchard fruits and nuts, vegetables, grain, and flowers. Greenhouse production, especially in the Surkhan Darya region, is flown to colder parts of the former USSR. Stock breeding, chiefly by Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, also contributes to the economy in mountainous regions. A black-market economy in produce, more recently expanded to manufactured goods smuggled from Afghanistan, also thrives. The privatization of industry has led to the idling of one in five factories, the sale of government tourist industry sites and the breakdown of education systems, especially higher education. Political stability has led to redevelopment of the economy along market lines leading to a larger production diversity in agriculture and the slow restoration of industry, especially the aluminum industrial complex.

Hydroelectric power and mining/processing form the main heavy industries in Tajikistan. Large dams (Qairoqqum, Nurek, Sarband, Boighazi, Markazi, and Sharshara) supply power to Soviet Central Asia and Afghanistan. Industrial manufacture is in cotton-related machinery. Together with light industry in textiles, furniture, and food processing, the industrial sector employs most non-Tajiks, especially Russians.

Under the Soviet system, trade within the union was conducted on a nonmonetary basis. Thus, Tajik cotton, hydroelectric power, and other products were traded by Moscow on the world market for hard currency or as barter items. In turn, Tajikistan received needed commodities and services. On a lower level, trade in fresh agricultural produce on private plots has flourished in urban areas where the government has constructed new bazaars to facilitate private trade. The transition to an independent state, with the concomitant civil war, end to Russian aid, the necessity for cash payments for energy and food have crippled trade. The reestablishment of regional trade depends on stability. Tajikistan exports to Russia, Ukraine, Belorus and to Switzerland. The inflation rate is 22%.

Labor patterns have undergone transformation under the Soviet system in two important ways: the importation of labor (Slavs, Koreans) and the mobilization of women into the formal labor force. This imposed system of labor has resulted in nominal universal employment. Most women, however, do agricultural work. The fast-growing Tajik rural population shows signs of having outpaced agricultural employment capacity. Entry into light or heavy industry appears barred by lack of training and aptitude. Women, regularly visible in high positions, continue to be the only ones who perform domestic labor.

Under collectivization, little land remained private, although private homes were frequently retained. As collectivization is dismantled, the problems of commercial crop production, the small amount of arable land for the large rural population, and the desire for private housing all create problems in a new economic order.

Extended families sharing adjacent houses or a single compound were the norm in traditional Tajik society. This pattern has been interrupted by the construction of apartment complexes in which units are distributed based on place of employment. Descent is determined through the father, although women retain their own family names.

Relationships are distinguished by gender and also (reflecting borrowings from Uzbek) by age among siblings.

Marriage patterns differ between urban and rural areas and over the past sixty years. In urban settings and among young people, Soviet influence on marriage may be seen in the exercise of choice in marriage partners and the importance of civil ceremonies. The couple may live with the groom's parents until a suitable apartment is located. In rural areas, the older pattern of arranged marriages with religious/traditional marriage celebrations continues to be honored. The couple will live with the man's family until a house is constructed. Divorce is rare in both settings.

The size of the rural domestic unit is large: the average rural household numbers seven to eight children as well as a grandparent or other relations. In urban areas the domestic unit is far smaller, averaging three to four children and possibly a paternal or maternal parent. According to Bennigsen and Wimbush (1986, 89) "traditional customs such as the kalym {bride-price}, the early marriage of girls, the levirate and sororate, preferences of marriage between cousins, sexual segregation, aksakalism {local rule by `white beards'} and even polygamy are observed by Tajiks more generally than by any other Muslim nationality of Central Asia."

The residence, if privately owned, and its contents are often inherited by the oldest son (or the one with whom the parent lived). Inherited property is infrequently sold.

Tajiks rarely send children to institutions for care, even if both parents work away from the home. Accommodation is made within the extended family for the care of young children. Children are raised to value family life, religious or ethical standards, their ethnic identity, and within this, their regional ties. Young Tajiks intermarry with Uzbeks and other cultural Muslims at a far higher rate than with Russians, despite the extensive Russification of urban elites.

Tajik society retains few objects of cohesion except as determined by general Central Asian customs and recent history. Cleavage among urban and rural groups rests also on place of origin and descent. Bukharan immigrants socialize with each other, as do people of various valleys. Soviet institutions and the workplace have brought them together, as has a common language, but without the economic and political institutions, the social fabric is fragile and susceptible to influence from emergent Islamic, nationalistic, and other forces. The core of social organization remains the extended family and region.

In the late Soviet era the pattern of political organization had begun to move toward gradual entrenchment of Tajiks into positions of real power within the Communist party. Independent parties, both nationalist and religious, have arisen since 1986 and increasingly their challenge to the government through demonstrations and eventually armed conflict has led to the redrawing of the entire political picture. The introduction of monitored elections, and the formation of coalition governments resulting from efforts to restore peace may lead to the acceptance of real political parties.

Modes of social behavior ingrained within the family function within society at large. These include loyalty to family members and fellow villagers. Other forms of social control exercised by the state have served to create tight groupings to preserve the welfare and safety of the group. Increasingly difficult socioeconomic conditions arising from population growth and ecological damage have begun to strain public order. The period of civil war has changed the social composition of Dushanbe in particular.

Social and political conflict is most apparent between local people and outsiders, in particular Russians. A secondary source is the regional friction over access to resources and services. Added to these among Bukharan Jews, fundamentalist Muslim groups, and secular Muslims are strains arising from religious custom or conviction. Resolution of some levels of conflict has emerged with the steady emigration of Slavs and Bukharan Jews. The confrontation between zealous Muslims and secular Muslims has led to armed conflict throughout much of the 1990s, conflict that became confounded with regionalism, democratic versus leftover soviet forces, and scramble for economic gain in light of the privatization of public property and factories.

Most religiously minded Tajiks belong to the Sunni sect, and within this to the Hanafi juridical school. Small, isolated groups, especially among the Pamir peoples of Iranian but not Tajik language, are devotees of Isma'ili Shiism, and yet a smaller portion follow the Ithna Ash'ari sect. As such, with the exception of Bukharan Jews, Slavs, other Christian-associated groups, and the urban-dwelling Koreans, the people of Tajikistan generally follow Islamic belief patterns. Belief in the supernatural, outside of formal Islam, falls into several categories: curative customs, fortune-telling, and ascription of bad fortune to the power of fate or of evil beings called jinn. The confrontation between zealous Muslims and secular Muslims has led to armed conflict throughout much of the 1990s, conflict that became confounded with regionalism, democratic versus leftover soviet forces, and scramble for economic gain in light of the privatization of public property and factories.

The level to which religious practice had survived underground during the Soviet period became apparent within the first years of independence. Prior to that strong evidence existed for the growth of Islamic practice among rural Tajiks, particularly the educated leadership on collective farms. In the absence of formal religious schools within Tajikistan (such as are found in Uzbekistan), individual Tajiks demonstrate a surprising familiarity with formal Islamic theological and juridical doctrine, owing in part to unregistered mullahs, Sufi brotherhoods, and a special category of half-Sufi-half-shaman; about a dozen shrines to saints are major religious centers (Bennigsen and Wimbush 1986, 91). Fasting during Ramadan, and especially the fast-breaking feast of Eid-e Fitr are popular and more public than in earlier years. Family ownership of a copy of the Quran is valued despite the lack of facilities for instruction in its contents. Informal teachers not recognized by the state or the Spiritual Directorate of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in Tashkent function throughout society on a semisecret level.

Rites of passage include circumcision of male children, marriage, and funerals. Holidays include the Islamic Eid-e Qorban and Eid-e Fitr, as well as Nowruz, the traditional Iranian new year celebrated at the vernal equinox.

Literature, especially poetry rooted in the brilliant classical culture that Tajiks share with other Iranian peoples, is foremost among traditional Tajik arts. Architectural decoration ( gach kari), carpet weaving, metal decoration, embroidery, and calligraphy have continued to be valued, although all these arts have acquired some level of Soviet content to conform with political dictates. In the fields of music, dance, and theater, innovations are widespread as Western arts have been introduced and local arts have been adapted. Following the formation of an independent republic, the possiblities of independent arts development were marred by war and conflict. An interest in the development of the very popular folk ensembles have reemerged.

Tajik medicine, like other medicine in Central Asia, falls into two branches: the Western-oriented branch represented by the Gastrointestinal and Chemistry Institutes of the Tajik Academy of Sciences established in 1955, and the traditions of folk medicine passed within particular families by word of mouth but based also on written works of medieval scientists such as Ibn Sina. The two branches have drawn closer together as the herbal cures offered by folk medicine have become the object of study of the scientific institutions and the medical properties of cumin and the like have been recognized.

Formal ideas of death follow either the nonreligious pattern or the Islamic one. It is customary for funeral proceedings for Tajik Communists to be conducted according to Muslim custom and for the burial to take place in a Muslim cemetery. Among the traditional populace, the afterlife is firmly held to be a time for reward and punishment for conduct in the present life.

The Tajiks file consists only of this culture summary. This is a revised (2001 by Eden Naby) version of the article originally published in: Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. 6, Russia and Eurasia/China, 1994. Paul Friedrich and Norma Diamond, eds. Boston, Mass.: G. K. Hall & Co.

Akiner, Shirin, (2002) Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation. Brookings Institution series Central Asian and Caucasian Prospects.

Atkin, Muriel (1989). The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute. At the Foot of the Blue Mountains: Stories by Tajik Authors (1984). Moscow: Raduga Publishers.M.

Bennigsen, Alexandre, and S. Enders Wimbush (1986). Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide, 89, 91. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Naby, Eden (1975). “Transitional Central Asian Literature: Tajik and Uzbek Prose Fiction from 1909 to 1932.” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University.

Rakowska-Harmstone, Theresa (1970). Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.