Mao

Alexander Meckelburg and Sophie Küspert-Rakotondrainy

Under the blanket term “Mao” we find a complex web of linguistically- and ethnically-differentiated peoples. They comprise the Omotic-speaking Anfillo Mao, the Bambasi Mao, the Hozo, the Sezo and Ganza. To some degree, people speaking a Koman language classified as Gwama also may call themselves (and be referred to by others as) Mao. However, Gwama people may also refer to themselves as Sit Shwala or “black people,” or by a specific clan name such as Kuro, Kiring, etc. All the Mao groups live scattered across West Wellega zone of Oromia region and the southwestern parts of Benishangul-Gumuz region, especially in Mao-Komo special woreda (district). Thus, "Mao" can be a homonym (for some Omotic groups), a self-designation, or a designation used by outsiders, depending on the historical relations with neighboring peoples, and more recent changes in the political landscape of ethno-linguistic identification and administrative re-mapping.

The term "Mao" in some Omotic languages simply translates as “man” or “people.” It is interesting to note that Lange (1982:260) mentions that "mawo" in the Kaffa language also can mean “slaves.”

Under Ethiopia’s current federal constitution (the supreme law of the land since 1995), the Mao in Benishangul-Gumuz regional state are organized into an administratively autonomous district called Mao-Komo special woreda (district). However, this district represents mostly Gwama-speaking Mao (Koman Mao). The Mao of Bambasi and other Omotic Mao communities live as minorities elsewhere in Benishangul-Gumuz and in the neighboring Oromia region. The Gwama are subsumed with the Komo, who form a separate district in the neighboring Gambela region. By contrast, the Omotic Mao in Oromia live as politically-unrecognized ethnic minorities because Oromia region’s constitution does not provide for the right to self-administration of ethnic minorities, denying the Omotic Mao a right otherwise enshrined in the federal constitution (Meckelburg 2017 “From ‘Subject to Citizen’?”).

The Mao—including both the Mao proper or Omotic Mao who use “mawo” in their self-designation (cf. Bender 1975), and those referred to as Mao—are minorities that live scattered across several administrative regions along Ethiopia’s border with Sudan. The Anfillo Mao are mostly confined to the Anfillo woreda (district) of West Wellega zone. The Hozo and Sezo people are found in the western part of Oromia region, particularly in the Kondala, Begi and Babo Gambel woredas of West Wellega zone. Koman Mao (Gwama speaking) live both in the Mao-Komo special woreda and the Begi woreda but, different from the lowland Gwama, they identify with the term ”Mao.” While a majority of Bambasi Mao live in the Bambasi woreda of Asosa zone, some have recently migrated further east to the Didessa Valley. The Ganza live mixed with the Gwama in the lowlands of Mao-Komo special woreda. All the different Mao groups live in ethnically-mixed communities.

Estimating Mao population is very difficult for several reasons. First, the official census numbers (Central Statistics Authority 1994, 2007) are confusing and unreliable. The census excludes certain Mao groups while including non-Mao groups or groups that are not present in the given locations. In Benishangul-Gumuz, for example, the Gwama-speaking groups are counted separately from Mao, as Komo people. Another challenge is that many people use their clan names as self-designation and do not identify under an umbrella ethnic term such as Mao. Additionally, there may be little correspondence between linguistic and ethnic affiliation. Speakers of a Gwama language, for example, often identify themselves either as ethnic Mao or by a clan name which may be both Mao and non-Mao. Lastly, who is or is not Mao is difficult to determine, especially for the many people of Mao descent who currently speak Oromo as their mother tongue. Some of these Oromo-speaking Mao continue to be identified by communities as Mao, while others have become designated as “black Oromo” (Küspert-Rakotondrainy 2018). As a rule, the ethnicity of a child is determined by the ethnicity of the father. Likewise, the ethnic identity of each household is often labelled after the self-identified ethnic affiliation of its head. The ethnic affiliation of wives remains unspecified, and census-takers seem to follow this cultural logic when counting individuals.

As of 2015 speakers of Gwama, Sit Shwala, Kiring, Kuro and related Koman languages were estimated at 25,000 individuals (Küspert 2015). The comparative estimate for speakers of Omotic Seze was around 13,000 individuals. The Hozo/Shuluyo and Ganza languages had the smallest number of speakers, estimated at 6,000 and 500, respectively (ibid). As of 2012 the population of Bambasi Mao was estimated to be 2,000-3,000 (Ahland 2012). The most recent estimate for Anfillo Mao was only about 500 active speakers (González-Ruibal 2014).

The Mao languages belong to different language families. The languages and dialects spoken by the Sezo, Hozo/Shuluyo, Bambasi and Ganza belong to the Omotic family (Bender 1975; Hayward 2000). Anfillo Mao belongs to the Gonga branch of the Omotic phylum, and is closely related to the Kaffa language. The Koman languages comprise taa kom’ (Komo), taa po’ (Opo, in Gambela region and Sudan), twa gwama (Gwama), twa 'mpa (Uduk), and the extinct Gule language. Although most Gwama speakers do not consider themselves Mao, Koman Mao speakers are the exception (Küspert 2015). In the literature we find the terms Northern Mao (mostly for Gwama) and Southern Mao (mostly for Anfillo), but they are not used consistently.

A second web of immigration was that of Sudanese Arabic communities from the west, who integrated into the Gwama. Some "Mao" groups—like the Wärrä Sättä, Wärrä Dawd, and Kiring—trace their descent to Riverine Arab communities of the Nile Valley. Although culturally most of them have become like the Oromo, these communities still speak Highland Gwama and identify themselves as Mao. A foundational figure of the Wärrä Dawd is the "Mao king" Kutu Golja, who became a competitor for regional power with Joote Tullu and Khojali al-Hassan.₁ The lineage of Kutu, whose descendants were landlords under the feudal monarchy, is today being claimed by the Kiring, whose members were instrumental in forming the Mao-Komo special woreda (district). The Kiring are Koman Mao and speakers of Gwama, although they may not accept that designation for their language.

By far the most important and lasting changes in the socio-cultural fabric of the region were brought about by the advancing Oromo people, who gradually conquered the Anfillo kingdom and integrated the Mao and Busase into the Mäčča linages. The term “Mao” may have moved north with the Oromo, and came to be the generic term used by the Oromo and Busase for the "black" societies of the area, such as the Mao and, to some extent, the Gwama (James 1980). At the end of the eighteenth century the Oromo migration in western Ethiopia had come to an end and, with the gaada (age-grade) system declining, several kingdoms under the leadership of mootis ("kings") emerged (Lewis 1964). The most decisive for the history of the Mao was the Leeqa Qellem kingdom under Joote Tullu. Joote expanded his kingdom and subjected neighboring ethnic groups. At times he claimed the areas of Anfillo as far as Gambela, and local memory has it that his realm reached northwards as far as Kurmuk (field notes, Meckelburg 2013). Most certainly, he subjected the Mao, Gwama and Komo who lived between Gidami and Begi. With the encroachment of the Ethiopian empire and the subjection of the Leeqa kingdom, Joote was forced to send annual tributes to Addis Ababa. Joote, in turn, imposed those tribute obligations on the Mao, Komo and Gwama, forcing them to deliver goods and agricultural products, and to work on the fields of Oromo notables (Yasin Mohammed 1982).

Bela Shangul (the original name of the sheikhdom that formed the nucleus of what would later become Benishangul-Gumuz), like Qellem before it, was subjugated by the advancing Ethiopian troops and became a tributary territory with semi-autonomous status within the newly expanded Ethiopian empire. The area was under sheikh Khojali, who delivered a variety of tribute to Addis Ababa, levied on the local population. The Berta, Mao and Komo worked in gold mines, hunted for ivory, collected honey, and were sold as slaves. Additionally, Khojali introduced a form of child tribute on the local population; every landlord under Khojali annually summoned children of their subjects, who were then sent to Addis Ababa as slaves (Abdussamad H. Ahmad 1999). Memories of exploitation and slavery indicate a lasting history of subjection that continued into the 1950s and beyond (Meckelburg 2015). The history of marginalization informs current patterns of social exclusion and manifests itself in the minority status of Mao groups (Meckelburg 2018).

Any outline of a history of the Mao must take into account the inter-ethnic and migratory processes that shaped the Ethiopian-Sudanese frontier region, and assume a dual perspective. One perspective recognizes the influence of the western frontier on the dynamics of ethnic history, both in Sudan and the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia. The other relates to the impacts of three historical events that took place between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the movement of the Oromo people, the wars in Anfillo, and the consequent migration of the Busase.

A third major population movement was the south-north migration of the Busase from the Anfillo forest, which influenced the inter-ethnic mosaic of the Mao region. The Busase are believed to be a noble clan of Kaffa origin. Toward the end of the sixteenth century some Busase migrants arrived in the Anfillo area, subjugating and incorporating the native Mao. The fact that the Anfillo Mao language is so closely related to the Kaffa language may indicate that there also was linguistic influence or language change. The conquerors exerted a form of semi-feudal political system over the Mao, reducing them to serfs. With the advancement of the Oromo in the seventeenth century, the Busase overlords migrated towards present-day West Wellega zone, Oromia region and Benishangul-Gumuz region, where they continued to impose their semi-feudal political system upon the "black population" of the area (field notes, Meckelburg 2011-2014). These findings are supported by the presence of descendants of the Busase in Benishangul-Gumuz (González-Ruibal 2014, 248–249).

In the face of increasing socio-cultural domination, many Mao were also incorporated into the clan structure of the Oromo, mostly through foster relations and intermarriage, forming a sub-set of mixed Oromo, the gäbaro (as opposed to booraana, the pure Oromo). When Joote was deposed and the Qellem kingdom brought under direct central administration around the turn of the century, many Oromo migrated in the direction of Begi. Begi formed a traditional boundary between the realm of Qellem and the territory (largely present-day Benishangul-Gumuz) under the watawit, groups of Sudanese migrants who came as Muslim preachers and traders, and integrated with the indigenous Berta nobility. Begi was the seat of one of the most powerful watawit sheikhs, Khojali al Hassan. (Atieb Ahmad Dafalla 1973; Triulzi 1981 “Salt, Gold, and Legitimacy”). As traders, the watawit were always also involved in the frontier slave trade that fed the demands of the Sudanese markets (Spaulding 1985, 1988).

Institutionalized slavery ended under Emperor Haile Selassie. During the subsequent Marxist-Leninist Därg regime, however, the Mao people continued to face severe discrimination, both by regime soldiers who accused the Mao of cooperating with the Oromo resistance, and from the Oromo resistance who suspected the Mao of supporting the regime (field notes, Küspert-Rakotondrainy 2017). In more general terms, the Mao remained in a subaltern status within the wider polities into which they had been historically drawn. Slavery and marginalization has become a foundational aspect in the self-perception of the Mao.

By the seventeenth century Berta migrants from Fazughli in Sudan encountered the local Gwama population around the river Tumat. The Gwama retreated southwards, coming into contact with Omotic Mao groups settling the region. Contact between Omotic and Nilo-Saharan groups in the region may go back as far as two millennia, judging from archaeological evidence for many similarities in material culture (González-Ruibal 2014, 254). Contact between the Omotic Mao and the Nilo-Saharan "Mao" is also supported by comparison of the clan terminologies between Koman Mao and Omotic Mao in the Tongo and Begi areas (Meckelburg 2017 “From ‘Subject to Citizen’?”); the occurrence of shared clan names points to a history of inter-ethnic clan relations and shared adoption.

With Ethiopia’s transition to an ethnically-constituted federal state, the Mao were officially recognized as one of several ethnic minorities. However, not all Mao groups benefited from this provision, partly because of the variations in the ways the constitution was interpreted and implemented in different regional states. In Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State, for example, the Mao have been awarded their own self-administered "ethnic district," the Mao-Komo special woreda. Within the district, however, representation of the Mao is dominated by Gwama-speaking Mao and Komo politicians; Bambasi Mao are underrepresented, while the Ganza are entirely excluded as non-natives, and hence less entitled to political representation. The Mao in Oromia region are entirely left out because the Oromia constitution doesn’t recognize the right to self-administration for any minority ethnic groups, denying them a right granted to other nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia.

In all territories the Mao remain a rather marginalized minority, largely overshadowed by the demographically- and politically-dominant Oromo people. Although this has created a dynamic of affiliation and assimilation, the Mao nonetheless retain much of their cultural and linguistic integrity. Internally, Mao communities are divided into many clans. The clans share many cultural features, suggesting the presence of a broad ethnic Mao cultural repertoire (González-Ruibal 2014). Since the Mao live in ethnically-mixed communities and intermarry with other Mao groups, the difference between them is not made explicit in everyday social life.

Mao settlements are predominately rural and, generally, the bigger the settlement the smaller the proportion of Mao compared to other ethnic groups. Often we can find several Mao groups living together in the same village. Especially in the highlands, Mao settlements are demographically dominated by Oromo neighbors. One may also find isolated Mao settlements in quite impassable areas, such as the swamps of the Dabus River and the hot plains along the border with South Sudan. Most of the isolated settlements represent Mao peoples’ historical migration to more marginal locations in the face of continuous pressure from stronger ethnic groups.

The settlement patterns within multi-ethnic villages often follow ethnic boundaries. In most cases, one finds the houses of Mao families clustered on one side and those of Oromo families on the opposite side, often several hundred meters apart from each other (field notes, Küspert-Rakotondrainy 2017). Within the Mao clusters, however, one does not find clear indication of whether the location of homesteads reflects divisions along language and clanship.

A common feature shared by all Mao settlements is the presence of a communal house, known as swal kwama (“the House of Gwama”) or as biash kera (“house of the spirits”) in the Hozo/Shuluyo language (González-Ruibal 2014). Grottanelli (1940) described these beehive-like tukuls as “hunting huts.” Typically located outside the main settlement, communal houses are used by diviners and healers.

Traditional Mao economy depended on shifting cultivation, supplemented by hunting and keeping some livestock. Over the years several Mao groups have adopted ox-drawn plow farming, especially in Oromo-inhabited areas. Most Mao have also adopted highland Ethiopian diets, including injera, as a substitute for their traditional porridge (pwash in Gwama, kalli in Hozo/Shuluyo). Their main staples are maize and sorghum. They also cultivate beans, teff, coffee, pumpkin, bananas, and some green vegetables. Hunting, fishing and beekeeping remain important secondary activities. Some families earn additional income from planting and selling a mild stimulant leaf called chat. Most Mao also keep a few chicken, sheep, and goats, but rarely cattle.

Commercial activities of the Mao are mostly limited to the selling of local produce, pottery, and forest products such as honey, firewood, charcoal, and bamboo. In exchange, Mao families purchase consumer goods such as sugar, salt, oil, clothes, and utensils. A growing number of Mao people are also buying and using mobile phones and battery-powered lights. However, both consumption and market participation is greatly constrained by limited access to the cash economy.

Studies suggest that pottery-making was a common activity in all Mao communities (González-Ruibal 2014). The craft seems to have vanished in recent times. Blacksmiths were historically overlooked, and often excluded as low-status castes. Yet, Mao women traditionally decorated themselves with locally-made ornaments such as wristbands, nose rings, and necklaces.

Traditionally, men used to work in the fields, cleared forest, built houses, and hunted game, while women took care of domestic activities, including cooking and childcare. When the men worked in the fields, women brought them food. Unlike their Oromo counterparts, Mao women rarely engaged in planting or harvesting.

Anfillo Mao have an origin myth in which land is considered a gift from God to all people to live on (Grottanelli 1940). Agricultural land in other Mao groups was distributed among patrilineages by councils of elders. To establish their own independent households, young men who came of age received land from their fathers.

Since the mass immigration of the Oromo beginning in the seventeenth century, land sharing has largely favored the latecomers at the expense of the Mao, resulting in substantial loss of land they had claimed ownership of for generations. Following the incorporation of the Mao into the Ethiopian state beginning in 1900, a majority of the Mao became tenants, working for landowning elites (balabat) who also demanded heavy taxes and tribute. The land reform of 1975 abolished this burden and enabled the Mao to cultivate the land without sharing the harvest with landlords. Beginning in 2005, some Mao communities have lost land to commercial investors and large-scale state projects.

The Mao kinship system remains little-studied. Part of the reason for this has to do with the complexity of identity issues in the area. There is sometimes little correlation between the language people speak and their ethnic or lineage identity. It is, for example, common to find individuals who speak the Hozo language but identify themselves as members of non-Hozo lineages or clans.

Some Mao groups are traditionally organized into patrilineal groups. The lineages are named after the founding father (e.g. Wärrä Sätta or “House of Sayyid,” Wärrä Dawd or “House of Dawd,” etc.). Other Mao groups are multi-ethnic, primarily identified by the specific territory they live in. An exception, the Koma (Gwama—not “Mao”) of Sudan have a strongly matrifocal kinship system (Theis 1995). A preference for maternal relatives is also reflected in the social organization of the Koman Mao.

People who belong to the same clan or ethnic group are often referred to as “uncle” or “aunt,” even if they may not be direct blood relatives. Also, people who are of the same age range might address each other as “uncle” or “aunt” as a sign of respect. Siblings and cousins, as well as some remotely-related individuals, often address each other as “brothers” or “sisters.”

The Mao marry outside their own clan. Intermarriage between Mao groups is common. Inter-marriage with Oromo is limited to bigger settlements like Tongo, Begi, or Kondala. Polygamy is widespread but, according to elders, the practice was unknown prior to the advent of Islam and Oromo settlers. First marriage usually happens in teenage years, after the girl is circumcised and has had her first menstruation. While boys and girls are allowed to spend time together, they cannot marry without the consent of their parents. Boys are encouraged to move out of their parents’ house when reaching fifteen to eighteen years old. During this time, boys enjoy a substantial amount of social freedom. The virginity of the girl is a precondition for a successful marriage.

There are two ways in which a boy can marry a girl, at least in eastern Mao settlements. The proper way is to approach her parents and pay them a bride price—usually in livestock and money. If he is rich, the boy might have to pay a three-figure amount (in terms of USD), which her family often uses for purchasing bridal gifts and some equipment for her new home (field notes, Küspert-Rakotondrainy 2017). If the groom is unable to do either of these, or some other reasons prevent him from arranging a proper marriage, he may abduct the bride. This may happen with or without the consent of the girl. Both first and successive wives can be abducted, after which a proper wedding can be arranged. Koman Mao used to practice sister-exchange marriage, which involved exchanging one’s own sister or cousin for another’s person’s sister or cousin in lieu of bride wealth or dowry payment. Sister exchange is now extinct in Komo, Gwama, and Koman Mao communities, although still partly practiced among the neighboring Gumuz and Uduk peoples.

The most common domestic group consists of a husband (household head), his wife or wives, and their children. Grandparents usually live on their own, but often in close proximity to their son. Older parents who cannot take adequate care of themselves often join the household of one of their sons. The household of a relatively well-off Mao may also include dependent cousins or other, younger family members. One woman may give birth to eight or more children, so Mao households tend to be large in size. Members of the same family often live in separate houses located within the same compound, and different wives usually do not share the same house.

Wives can inherit the property of deceased husbands. A wife who brought a specific property into the marriage, or acquired a piece of land as her own private property, will continue to have exclusive rights over that property or land. The wives, in turn, will distribute their property to their children. Widows may be inherited by a brother of their deceased husband, who becomes responsible for defending and taking care of them.

Small children are socialized to internalize aspects of the Mao culture and way of life. Once out of the domestic sphere, however, Mao children are subject to a range of outside influences, including schools, markets, and the dominant Oromo culture. The impact of Oromo culture is especially noticeable on Mao children who must attend public school in Oromia region, where instruction is only in Oromo. This is not the case in the lowlands of Benishangul-Gumuz, where Gwama and Komo children (who do not self-identify as Mao) attend school in local languages.

Children are expected to help their parents in day-to-day economic activities. The boys help their fathers in the field and with other outdoor activities, while girls help their mothers in the kitchen and with taking care of younger siblings. Some male children are sent to other families as domestic workers or as cattle herders. These foster families usually are richer Oromo families, and the boy may stay there either for just a few years or for his entire childhood.

In villages where a government school is located, many children attend. For a host of reasons, the number of students begins to decline after the first cycle (fourth grade), and becomes much smaller after second cycle (ninth grade). For girls, the most common reason is either that they marry or they are unable to move to a larger village to attend the next cycle. For boys, the main reason is the financial constraint of moving to an area where secondary schools are located.

The Omotic Mao used to have traditional chiefs or “kings” who ruled over certain areas. After incorporation into the Ethiopian empire, the power of traditional leaders declined in favor of new elites drawn from Oromo and watawit (immigrant Muslim Sudanese) notables. The new leaders represented the central government of Ethiopia, collecting taxes and imposing government regulations. The power of the traditional Mao chief was reduced to ruling over just a few villages, and people still tend to know which villages belonged to which chiefdom.

There are still some living “Mao kings” who reign in some easternmost Mao areas, like Tesfa Dagefa of Yari village in the Dabus Valley, Oromia. Tesfa inherited this position from his father, whose father was also recognized as a traditional king. Tesfa is cooperating with the elected Oromo leader of the village who is the officially recognized chair of the local (Kebelle) government. Thus, the Mao chief does not have any formal power, and the extent to which he is able to bring forward any requests or complaints from his people is extremely limited (field notes, Küspert-Rakotondrainy 2017).

The Koman Mao used to have a traditional egalitarian system, with councils of elders being the most important socio-political institution. They share this trait with the Gwama, who are largely acephalous and do not overtly discriminate between women and men; in these communities, women also can become diviners and healers. With the advent of the feudal-like balabat system, the communities were governed by a class of male Oromo land-grant holders called Aba Qorro. After the 1974 land reform, the Mao, like other rural Ethiopians, were organized into peasant associations to be governed by elected farmers.

Conflicts in traditional Mao society were managed by a council of elders. After incorporation into the Ethiopian empire this responsibility was entrusted to the Aba Qorro or balabat (semi-feudal landlord) of each area. Since the mid-1990s, conflicts can either mediated informally by village elders, or formally brought by concerned parties to the attention of the local, k’ebele, chairperson and, through him, to the regional court and local police headquarters.

The Mao peoples have a common history of conquest and subjugation by outside groups. The Anfillo Mao were conquered by the Busase. Later, the Busase themselves dispersed to the north in an attempt to escape from Oromo domination. These patterns of subjection to serfdom, as well as enslavement, have led to the flight of many groups over the years. During the civil war of the 1980s, the Mao joined—sometimes under force—the Oromo Liberation Front. Identity conflicts, fueled by Ethiopia’s re-mapping along ethnic lines, continues to be a major concern for Mao minorities who find it difficult to exert their constitutionally-enshrined political and cultural rights to self-administration.

Traditional Mao religion centered on one creator God, referred to in Gwama as Yere. The similarity of this term with the Kaffa deity “Yero” suggests the Mao peoples’ historical connection with the Gonga people. Other names for God may also be found, such as “Tokorababo” in Hozo/Shuluyo. Mao communities worship in a special house, led by a male spiritual leader. The worship may involve sacrificing a hen or sheep, asking for God’s blessing. Dogs and menstruating women are prohibited from entering into sacred places. Different Mao groups worship in their respective mother tongues.

The Mao observe different occasions with special rituals and song-prayers. For special occasions (weddings, hunting expeditions, harvesting, etc.) local beer is served, together with traditional food like maize porridge. Local spiritual leaders may organize special ceremonies when someone is sick, to call for rain, or to bless the harvest.

Although most Mao are formally Muslims, many still practice aspects of their traditional religion. Mao men and women who have converted to Christianity, in contrast, tend to stop practicing their traditional religion. In the eyes of many Mao, local mosques and traditional prayer houses are equally sacred places.

Music and dance are a very important part of Mao cultures, and they have their own special dances and songs, performed at different occasions. During performances, the musicians stand in the middle of a circle and the people dance around them. This pattern is shared by all Mao groups, including the Gwama and Komo people of the lowlands. Commonly used musical instruments include horns of different sizes, various kinds of bamboo flutes, and drums or other rhythm instruments (pamba, yeset and gamfu in Gwama; negere or giba in Hozo). Some of the wind instruments, most notably the zumbara, are borrowed from Berta people. The Hozo have horns in nine different sizes and ranges—from smallest to largest they are called: teke, dongo, kiazi, kutsi, kiani, dilde, shianda, shianda shi. It is usually the men who play the instruments and the women sing in high-pitched voices or ululate.

Traditionally, people go to an elder who is recognized as a healer (kash) in Gwama). Every village has such a healer, and both men and women can have this position, depending on their skills and age. Traditional medicines that can cure a range of illnesses are made from tree roots, leaves, and other forest products. Oracles and fortune-telling are common. Sacrifices (e.g. of a hen) are still made to God to asks for better rains or more fruitful harvests.

When a person dies all relatives gather to pray. Traditional food and coffee is prepared, and people stay at the deceased person’s house for more than a week, after which the body is buried. If the deceased is a woman who came to the area because of her husband, she will be brought back to her home village to be buried. Traditionally, people are buried under large trees, but nowadays they may also be buried in a graveyard belonging to a mosque.

The culture summary was written by Alexander Meckelburg and Sophie Küspert-Rakotondrainy in June, 2018.

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